In general, recovery-oriented approaches accomplish repair by restoring a system to its state at an earlier point in time. If that point in time is too recent, then the restoration will include the damage to the system caused by the attack. If that point in time is too far back, an unacceptable amount of useful work may be lost.
A good example is restoring a backup of a computer's files; the first question that the user asks when a backup file is needed is, When was my most recent backup? A recovery-oriented approach is not particularly useful in any environment in which the attack causes effects on physical systems—if an attack causes a generator to explode, no amount of recovery on the computer systems attacked will restore that generator to working order.
But the operator still needs to restore the computer so that the replacement generator won't be similarly damaged. In large systems or services, reverting to a known system state before the security breach may well be infeasible. A resilient system is one whose performance degrades gradually rather than catastrophically when its other defensive mechanisms are insufficient to stem an attack. A resilient system will still continue to perform some of its intended functions, although perhaps more slowly or for fewer people or with fewer applications.
Redundancy is one way to provide a measure of resilience. For example, Internet protocols for transmitting information are designed to account for the loss of intermediate nodes—that is, to provide redundant paths in most cases for information to flow between two points. A second approach to achieving resilience is to design a system or network without a single point of failure—that is, it should be impossible to cause the system or network to cease functioning entirely by crippling or disabling any one component of the system.
Unfortunately, discover ing single points of failure is sometimes difficult because the system or network in question is so complex. Moreover, the easiest way to achieve redundancy for certain systems is simply to replicate the system and run the different replications together. But if one version has a flaw, simple replication of that version replicates the flaw as well.
The limitations of the measures described above to protect important information technology assets and the information they contain are well known. These also may reduce important functionality in the systems being protected—they become more difficult, slower, and inconvenient to use. They are also reactive—they are invoked or become operational only when a hostile operation has been recognized as having occurred or is occurring.
The sections below describe some of the components that a strategy of active cyber defense might logically entail. Deception is often a useful defensive technique. For example, an intruder bent on cyber exploitation seeks useful information. An intruder that can be fooled into exfiltrating false or misleading information that looks like the real thing may be misled into taking action harmful to his own interests, and at the very least has been forced to waste time, effort, and resources in obtaining useless information.
Honeypots intentionally contain no real or valuable data and are kept separate from an organization's production systems. Indeed, in most cases, systems administrators want intruders to succeed in compromising or breaching the security of honeypots to a certain extent so that they can log all the activity and learn from the techniques and methods used by the intruder. This process allows administrators to be better prepared for hostile operations against their real production systems. Honeypots are very useful for gathering information about new types of operation, new techniques, and information on how things like worms or malicious code propagate through systems, and they are used as much by security researchers as by network security administrators.
When the effects of a honeypot are limited in scope to the victim's systems and networks, the legal and policy issues are relatively limited.
But if they have effects on the intruder's systems, both the legal and the policy issues become much more complex. For example, a honeypot belonging to A might contain files of falsified information that themselves carry malware. When the intruder B exfiltrates these files and then views them on B's own systems, the malware in these files is launched and conducts its own offensive operations on B's systems in certain ways.
What might A's malware do on B's systems? It might erase files on B's systems. It might install a way for A to penetrate B's systems in the future. All of these actions raise legal and policy issues regarding their propriety. Disruption is intended to reduce the damage being caused by an adversarial cyber operation in progress, usually by affecting the operation of the computer systems being used to conduct the operation.
An example of disrupting an operation in progress would be disabling the computers that control a botnet. Of course, this approach presumes that the controlling computers are known. The first time the botnet is used, such knowledge is unlikely. But over time, patterns of behavior might suggest the identity of those computers and an access path to them. Thus, disruption would be easier to accomplish after repeated attacks. Under most circumstances, disabling the computers controlling an adversarial operation runs a risk of violating domestic U.
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However, armed with court orders, information technology vendors and law enforcement authorities have worked together in a number of instances to disrupt the operation of botnets by targeting and seizing servers and controllers associated with those botnets.
An example of such action was a joint Microsoft-Federal Bureau of Investigation effort to take down the Citadel botnet in the May-June time frame. The effort involved Microsoft filing a civil lawsuit against the Citadel botnet operators. With a court-ordered seizure request and working with U. Marshals, employees from Microsoft seized servers from two hosting facilities in New Jersey and Philadelphia. At the same time, the FBI provided related information to its overseas law enforcement counterparts. Preemption—sometimes also known as anticipatory self-defense—is the first use of cyber force against an adversary that is itself about to conduct a hostile cyber action against a victim.
The idea of preemption as a part of active defense has been discussed mostly in the context of national security. Preemption as a defensive strategy is a controversial subject, and the requirements of executing a preemptive strike in cyberspace are substantial. When the number of possible cyber adversaries is almost limitless, how would a country know who was about to launch such an operation?
Keeping all such parties under surveillance using cyber means and other intelligence sources would seem to be a quite daunting task and yet necessary in an environment in which threats can originate from nearly anywhere. Also, an imminent action by an adversary by definition requires that the adversary take nearly all of the measures and make all of the preparations needed to carry out that action.
The potential victim considering preemption must thus be able to target the adversary's cyber assets that would be used to launch a hostile operation. An important lesson that is often lost amidst discussions of cybersecurity is that cybersecurity is not only about technology to make us more secure in cyberspace. Indeed, technology is only one aspect of such security, and is arguably not even the most important aspect of security.
The present section discusses a number of the most important nontechnological factors that affect cybersecurity.
The task of securing the routing protocols of the Internet makes a good case study of the nontechnical complexities that can emerge in what might have been thought of as a purely more Many problems of cybersecurity can be understood better from an economic perspective: Taken together, economic factors go a long way toward explaining why, beyond any technical solutions, cybersecurity is and will be a hard problem to address. Many actors make decisions that affect cybersecurity: There is some truth to such assertions, and yet it is important to understand the incentives for these actors to behave as they do.
For example, technology vendors have significant financial incentives to gain a first-mover or a first-to-market advantage. But the logic of reducing time to market runs counter to enhancing security, which adds complexity, time, and cost in design and testing while being hard to value or even assess by customers.
In the end-user space, organizational decision makers and individuals do sometimes perhaps even often take cybersecurity into account. But these parties have strong incentives to take only those cybersecurity measures that are valuable for addressing their own cybersecurity needs, and few incentives to take measures that primarily benefit the nation as a whole. In other words, cybersecurity is to a large extent a public good; much of the payoff from security investments may be captured by society rather than directly by any individual firm that invests.
For example, an attacker A who wishes to attack victim V will compromise intermediary M's computer facilities in order to attack V. This convoluted routing is done so that V will have a harder time tracing the attack back to A. However, the compromise on M's computers will usually not damage them very much, and indeed M may not even notice that its computers have been compromised. Investments made by M to protect its computers will not benefit M, but will, rather, protect V. But an Internet-using society would clearly benefit if all of the potential intermediaries in the society made such investments.
Many similar examples also have economic roots. Is the national cybersecurity posture resulting from the investment decisions of many individual firms acting in their own self-interest adequate from a societal perspective? Social engineering is possible because the human beings who install, configure, operate, and use IT systems of interest can be compromised through deception and trickery. Spies working for an intruder may be unknowingly hired by the victim, and more importantly and commonly, users can be deceived into actions that compromise security.
Many instances involving the compromise of users or operators involve e-mails, instant messages, and files that are sent to the target at the initiative of the intruder often posing as someone known to the victim , or other sources that are visited at the initiative of the target. Examples of the latter include links to appealing Web pages and or downloadable software applications, such as those for sharing pictures or music files.
Another channel for social engineering is the service providers on which many organizations and individuals rely. Both individuals and organizations obtain Internet connectivity from Internet service providers. Many organizations make use of external firms to arrange employee travel or to manage their IT security or repair needs. Many organizations also obtain cybersecurity services from third parties, such as a security software vendor that might be bribed or otherwise persuaded to ignore a particular virus. Service providers are potential security vulnerabilities, and thus might well be intermediate targets in an offensive operation directed at the true ultimate target.
4.1. APPROACHES TO IMPROVING SECURITY
Decision making under conditions of high uncertainty will almost surely characterize U. Under conditions of high uncertainty, crisis decision-making processes are often flawed. Stein describes a number of issues that affect decision making in this context.
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For example, under the category of factors affecting a rational decision-making process, Stein points to uncertainty about realities on the ground as an important influence. In this view, decision making yields suboptimal outcomes because the actors involved do not have or understand all of the relevant information about the situation. Uncertainties may relate to the actual balance of power e. Users are a key component of any information technology system in use, and inappropriate or unsafe user behavior on such a system can easily lead to reduced security.
Security education has two essential components: To promote security awareness, various reports have sought to make the public aware of the importance of cybersecurity. But it is also likely that such reports do not motivate individual users to take cybersecurity more seriously than would a specific targeted and demonstrated threat that could entail substantial personal costs to them. As for security-responsible behavior, most children do receive some education when it comes to physical security. For example, they are taught to use locks on doors, to recognize dangerous situations, to seek help when confronted with suspicious situations, and so on.
But a comparable effort to educate children about some of the basic elements of cybersecurity does not appear to exist. To illustrate some of what might be included in education for security-responsible behavior, a course taught at the University of Washington in , intended to provide a broad education in the fundamentals of information technology for lay people, set forth the following objectives for its unit on cybersecurity: Security features are often too complex for organizations or individuals to manage effectively or to use conveniently. Security is hard for users, administrators, and developers to understand, making it all too easy to use, configure, or operate systems in ways that are inadvertently insecure.
Moreover, security and privacy technologies originally were developed in a context in which system administrators had primary responsibility for security and privacy protections and in which the users tended to be sophisticated. Today, the user base is much wider—including the vast majority of employees in many organizations and a large fraction of households—but the basic models for security and privacy are essentially unchanged.
Security features can be clumsy and awkward to use and can present significant obstacles to getting work done. As a result, cybersecurity measures are all too often disabled or bypassed by the users they are intended to protect. Because the intent of security is to make a system completely unusable to an unauthorized party but completely usable to an authorized one, desires for security and desires for convenience or ease of access are often in tension—and usable security seeks to find a proper balance between the two.
For example, users often want to transfer data electronically between two systems because it is much easier than rekeying the data by hand. But establishing an electronic link between the systems may add an access path that is useful to an intruder. Taking into account the needs of usable security might call for establishing the link but protecting it or tearing down the link after the data has been transferred. In other cases, security techniques do not transfer well from one technology to another. For example, it is much more difficult to type a long password on a mobile device than on a keyboard, and yet many mobile applications for a Web service require users to use the same password for access as they do for the desktop computer equivalent.
Also, usable security has social and organizational dimensions as well as technological and psychological ones. The Congressional Research Service has identified more than 50 federal statutes addressing various aspects of cybersecurity either directly or indirectly. Several statutes protect computers and data by criminalizing certain actions. As this report is being written, the scope and the nature of precisely how federal agencies have complied with various portions of FISA are under investigation. A number of other statutes are designed to provide notification in the event that important information is compromised.
If such information is personally identifiable, data breach laws generally require notification of the individuals with whom such information is associated. Federal securities law the Securities Act of and the Securities Exchange Act of requires firms to disclose to investors timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that is important to an investment decision.
Under this authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission's Division of Corporation Finance in provided voluntary guidance to firms regarding their obligations to disclose information relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents. Finally, national security law may affect how the United States may itself use cyber operations in an offensive capacity for damaging adversary information technology systems or the information therein.
For example, the War Powers Act of restricts presidential authority to use the U. However, the War Powers Act was passed in —that is, at a time that cyber conflict was not a serious possibility—and the War Powers Act is poorly suited to U. Also, the Posse Comitatus Act of places some constraints on the extent to which, if at all, the Department of Defense—within which is resident a great deal of cybersecurity knowledge—can cooperate with civil agencies on matters related to cybersecurity.
International law does not explicitly address the conduct of hostile cyber operations that cross international boundaries. However, one international agreement—the Convention on Cybercrime—seeks to harmonize national laws that criminalize certain specifically identified computer-related actions or activities, to improve national capabilities for investigating such crimes, and to increase cooperation on investigations. International law does potentially touch on hostile cyber operations that cross international boundaries when a hostile cyber operation is the instrumentality through which some regulated action is achieved.
A particularly important example of such a case is the applicability of the laws of war or, equivalently, the law of armed conflict to cyberattacks. Today, the law of armed conflict is expressed in two legal instruments—the UN Charter and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The UN Charter is the body of treaty law that governs when a nation may engage in armed conflict.
Complications and uncertainty regarding how the UN Charter should be interpreted with respect to cyberattacks result from three fundamental facts:. The Geneva and Hague Conventions regulate how a nation engaged in armed conflict must behave. But as with the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions are silent on cyberattack as a modality of conflict, and how to apply the principles mentioned above in any instance involving cyber conflict may be uncertain in some cases.
A second important example of an implicit relationship between hostile cyber operations and international law is that of cyber exploitation by one nation to acquire intelligence information from another. Espionage is an illegal activity under the domestic laws of virtually all nations, but not under international law. There are no limits in international law on the methods of collecting information, what kinds of information can be collected, how much information can be collected, or the purposes for which collected information may be used. As noted above, international law is also articulated through customary international law—that is, the general and consistent practices of states followed from a sense of legal obligation.
Such law is not codified in the form of treaties but rather is found in international case law. Here too, guidance for what counts as proper behavior in cyberspace is lacking. Universal adherence to norms of behavior in cyberspace could help to provide nations with information about the intentions and capabilities of other adherents, in both strategic and tactical contexts, but there are no such norms today.
Foreign nations are governed by their own domestic laws that relate to cybersecurity. When another nation's laws criminalize similar bad activities in cyberspace, the United States and that other nation are more likely to be able to work together to combat hostile cyber operations that cross their national borders.
For example, the United States and China have been able to find common ground in working together to combat the production of child pornography and spam. But when security- or privacy-related laws of different nations are inconsistent, foreign law often has an impact on the ability of the United States to trace the origin of hostile cyber operations against the United States or to take action against perpetrators under another nation's jurisdiction.
Legal dissimilarities have in the past impeded both investigation and prosecution of hostile cyber operations that have crossed international boundaries. From an organizational perspective, the response of the United States to a hostile operation in cyberspace by a nonstate actor is often characterized as depending strongly on whether that operation is one that requires a law enforcement response or a national security response. This characterization is based on the idea that a national security response relaxes many of the constraints that would otherwise be imposed on a law enforcement response.
For example, active defense—either by active threat neutralization or by cyber retaliation—may be more viable under a national security response paradigm, whereas a law enforcement paradigm might call for strengthened passive defense measures to mitigate the immediate threat and other activities to identify and prosecute the perpetrators. When a cyber incident first occurs, its scope and nature are not likely to be clear, and many factors relevant to a decision will not be known. For example, because cyber weapons can act over many time scales, anonymously, and clandestinely, knowledge about the scope and character of a cyberattack will be hard to obtain quickly.
Attributing the incident to a nation-state or to a non-national actor may not be possible for an extended period of time. Other nontechnical factors may also play into the assessment of a cyber incident, such as the state of political relations with other nations that are capable of launching the cyber operations involved in the incident. Once the possibility of a cyberattack is made known to national authorities, information must be gathered to determine perpetrator and purpose, and must be gathered using the available legal authorities.
Some entity within the federal government integrates the relevant information, and then it or another higher entity e. How might some of the factors described above be taken into account as a greater understanding of the event develops? Law enforcement equities are likely to predominate in the decision-making calculus if the scale of the attack is small, if the assets targeted are not important military assets or elements of critical infrastructure, or if the attack has not created substantial damage.
However, an incident with sufficiently serious consequences e. Other factors likely to influence such a determination are the geographic origin of the attack and the nature of the party responsible for the attack e. Code , the Department of Defense Title 10 of the U. Code , and the intelligence community Title 50 of the U. Code , but in an era of international terrorist threats, these distinctions are not as clear in practice as when threats to the United States emanated primarily from other nations.
That is, certain threats to the United States implicate both law enforcement and national security equities and call for a coordinated response by all relevant government agencies. When critical infrastructure is involved, the entity responsible for integrating the available information and recommending next steps to be taken has evolved over time.
Whatever the mechanisms for aggregating and integrating information related to a cyber incident, the function served is an essential one—and if the relationships, the communications pathways, the protocols for exchanging data, and the authorities are not established and working well in advance, responses to a large unanticipated cyber incident will be uncoordinated and delayed. Deterrence relies on the idea that inducing a would-be intruder to refrain from acting in a hostile manner is as good as successfully defending against or recovering from a hostile cyber operation.
Deterrence through the threat of retaliation is based on imposing negative consequences on adversaries for attempting a hostile operation. Imposing a penalty on an intruder serves two functions. It serves the goal of justice—an intruder should not be able to cause damage with impunity, and the penalty is a form of punishment for the intruder's misdeeds. In addition, it sets the precedent that misdeeds can and will result in a penalty for the intruder, and it seeks to instill in future would-be intruders the fear that he or she will suffer from any misdeeds they might commit, and thus to deter such action, thereby discouraging further misdeeds.
What the nature of the penalty should be and who should impose the penalty are key questions in this regard. Note that a penalty need not take the same form as the hostile action itself. What counts as a sufficient attribution of hostile action to a responsible party is also a threshold issue, because imposing penalties on parties not in fact responsible for a hostile action has many negative ramifications. For deterrence to be effective, the penalty must be one that affects the adversary's decision-making process and changes the adversary's cost-benefit calculus.
Possible penalties in principle span a broad range, including jail time, fines, or other judicially sanctioned remedies; damage to or destruction of the information technology assets used by the perpetrator to conduct a hostile cyber operation; loss of or damage to other assets that are valuable to the perpetrator; or other actions that might damage the perpetrator's interests.
But the appropriate choice of penalty is not separate from the party imposing the penalty. Law enforcement authorities and the judicial system rely on federal and state law to provide penalties, but they presume the existence of a process in which a misdeed is investigated, perpetrators are prosecuted, and if found guilty are subject to penalties imposed by law.
As noted in Section 4. Deterrence in this context is based on the idea that a high likelihood of imposing a significant penalty for violations of such laws will deter such violations. In a national security context, when the misdeed in question affects national security, the penalty can take the form of diplomacy such as demarches and breaks in diplomatic relations, economic actions such as trade sanctions, international law enforcement such as actions taken in international courts, nonkinetic military operations such as deploying forces as visible signs of commitment and resolve, military operations such as the use of cruise missiles against valuable adversary assets, or cyber operations launched in response.
In a cyber context, the efficacy of deterrence is an open question. Deterrence was and is a central construct in contemplating the use of nuclear weapons and in nuclear strategy—because effective defenses against nuclear weapons are difficult to construct, using the threat of retaliation to persuade an adversary to refrain from using nuclear weapons is regarded by many as the most plausible and effective alternative to ineffective or useless defenses.
Indeed, deterrence of nuclear threats in the Cold War established the paradigm in which the conditions for successful deterrence are largely met. It is an entirely open question whether cyber deterrence is a viable strategy. Although nuclear weapons and cyber weapons share one key characteristic the superiority of offense over defense , they differ in many other key characteristics.
For example, it is plausible to assume that a large-scale nuclear attack can be promptly recognized and attributed, but it is not plausible to assume the same for a large-scale cyberattack.
How should a system's security be assessed? Cybersecurity analysts have strong intuitions that some systems are more secure than others, but assessing a system's cybersecurity posture turns out to be a remarkably thorny problem. From a technical standpoint, assessing the nature and extent of a system's security is confounded by two factors:. Viewing system security from an operational perspective rather than just a technical one shows that security is a holistic, emergent, multidimensional property of a system rather than a fixed attribute.
Indeed, many factors other than technology affect the security of a system, including the system's configuration, the cybersecurity training and awareness of the people using the system, the access control policy in place, the boundaries of the system e. Accordingly, a discussion cast simply in terms of whether a system is or is not secure is almost certainly misleading.
Assessing the security of a system must include qualifiers such as, Security against what kind of threat? Under what security policy? What does the discussion above imply for the development of cybersecurity metrics—measurable quantities whose value provides information about a system or network's resistance to a hostile cyber operation? These parties would be able to quantify cost-benefit tradeoffs in implementing security features, and they would be able to determine if System A is more secure than System B. Good cybersecurity metrics would also support a more robust insurance market in cybersecurity founded on sound actuarial principles and knowledge.
The holy grail for cybersecurity analysts is an overall cybersecurity metric that is applicable to all systems and in all operating environments. The discussion above, not to mention several decades' worth of research and operational experience, suggests that this holy grail will not be achieved for the foreseeable future. But other metrics may still be useful under some circumstances. With the particular examples chosen, a possible logic chain is that an organization that increases its cybersecurity expenditures can reduce the number of cybersecurity incidents and thereby reduce the annual losses due to such incidents.
Of course, if an organization spends its cybersecurity budget unwisely, the presumed relationship between budget and number of incidents may well not hold. Also, the correlation between improvement in a cybersecurity input metric and better cybersecurity outcomes may well be disrupted by an adaptive adversary. The benefit of the improvement may endure, however, against adversaries that do not adapt—and thus the resulting cybersecurity posture against the entire universe of threats may in fact be improved. Within each of the approaches for improving cybersecurity described above, research is needed in two broad categories.
First, problem-specific research is needed to find good solutions for pressing cybersecurity problems. A good solution to a cybersecurity problem is one that is effective, is robust against a variety of attack types, is inexpensive and easy to deploy, is easy to use, and does not significantly reduce or cripple other functionality in the system of which it is made a part. Problem-specific research includes developing new knowledge on how to improve the prospects for deployment and use of known solutions to given problems.
Second, even assuming that everything known today about improving cybersecurity was immediately put into practice, the resulting cybersecurity posture—although it would be stronger and more resilient than it is now—would still be inadequate against today's high-end threat, let alone tomorrow's. Closing this gap—a gap of knowledge—will require substantial research as well. As for the impact of research on the nation's cybersecurity posture, it is not reasonable to expect that research alone will make any substantial difference at all.
Indeed, many factors must be aligned if research is to have a significant impact. Specifically, IT vendors must be willing to regard security as a product attribute that is coequal with performance and cost; IT researchers must be willing to value cybersecurity research as much as they value research into high-performance or cost-effective computing; and IT purchasers must be willing to incur present-day costs in order to obtain future benefits.
With a well-constructed algorithm, hashes of two different bit sequences are very unlikely to have the same hash value. See the OpenNet Initiative http: The whitelisting approach can be extended to other scenarios. For example, in , a security expert was able to fool a number of fingerprint sensors by lifting latent fingerprints from a water glass using soft gummy bear candy. Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U. Sears, and Jack S. Fischer, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Turn recording back on.
National Center for Biotechnology Information , U. Show details Committee on Developing a Cybersecurity Primer: Reducing Reliance on Information Technology The most basic way to improve cybersecurity is to reduce the use of information technology IT in critical contexts. Knowing That Security Has Been Penetrated Detection From the standpoint of an individual system or network operator, the only thing worse than being penetrated is being penetrated and not knowing about it. Assessment A hostile action taken against an individual system or network may or may not be part of a larger adversary operation that affects many systems simultaneously, and the scale and the nature of the systems and networks affected in an operation are critical information for decision makers.
Defending a System or Network Defending a system or network means taking actions so that a hostile actor is less successful than he or she would otherwise be in the absence of defensive actions. Some of the most important approaches to defense include: Reducing the number of vulnerabilities contained in any deployed IT system or network. There are two methods for doing so. Eliminating or blocking known but unnecessary access paths. Many IT systems or networks have a variety of ways to access them that are unnecessary for their effective use.
Security-conscious system administrators often disconnect unneeded wireless connections and wired jacks; disable USB ports; change system access controls to quickly remove departing employees or to restrict the access privileges available to individual users to only those that are absolutely necessary for their work; and install firewalls that block traffic from certain suspect sources. Disconnecting from the Internet is a particular instance of eliminating an access path.
Vendors of major operating systems provide the option of and sometimes require restricting the programs that can be run to those whose provenance can be demonstrated. In principle, whitelisting requires that the code of an application be cryptographically signed by its author using a public digital certification of identity, and thus a responsible party can be identified if the program does damage to the user's system. Another issue for whitelisting is who establishes any given whitelist—the user who may not have the expertise to determine safe parties or someone else who may not be willing or able to provide the full range of applications desired by the user or may accept software too uncritically for inclusion on the whitelist.
Potential conflicts with performance and functionality. Emphasizing on collaboration and readiness for potential cyber threats, the cyber drills and accompanying workshops are one of the tools to deliver the success of the Global Cybersecurity Agenda GCA. This include the challenges faced and possible measures to enhance the related legislation so as to ensure a steady and regular flow of communication and availability of internet related services.
The objectives of the CIRT assessment study were to assess the capability and readiness to build a sustainable national CIRT, based on an analysis of stakeholder attributes with relevance to security incident response needs of the concerned countries. It discusses what constitutes a national Cybersecurity strategy and it seeks to accomplish and the context that influences its execution. The Guide also discusses how States and other relevant stakeholders such as private sector organisations can build capacity to execute a cybersecurity strategy and the resources required to address risks.
As national capabilities, needs and threats vary, the document recommends that countries use national values as the basis for strategies for two main reasons. Firstly, culture and national interests influence the perception of risk and the relative success of defences against cyber threats. Secondly, a strategy rooted in national values is likely to gain support of stakeholders such as the judiciary and private sector. Lastly, since cybersecurity is a branch of information security, the documents seeks to adopt global security standards.
The guide is intended to give developing countries a tool allowing them to better understand the economic, political, managerial, technical and legal Cybersecurity related issues in the spirit of the Global Cybersecurity Agenda.
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The purpose of it is to help countries get prepared to face issues linked to ICT deployment, uses, vulnerabilities and misuses. The content of the guide has been selected to meet the needs of developing and, in particular, least developed countries, in terms of the use of information and communication technologies for the provision of basic services in different sectors, while remaining committed to developing local potential and increasing awareness among all of the stakeholders.
National government agencies and institutions exist to implement and oversee these activities, and the responsibility for the operation and management of information infrastructures has traditionally been shared among government, owners and operators, and users. Protection of the information infrastructure formerly the PSTN network has been a longstanding concern of member states and the work of the ITU is testimony to this concern. However, the use of information systems and networks and the entire information technology environment have changed dramatically in recent years.
Increasing interconnectivity, the growing intelligence at the edges of the network, and the expanding role of information infrastructures in the economic and social life of a nation demand a new look at existing measures for the enhancement of cybersecurity Committed to connecting the world.
It follows publication of The Quest for Cyber Peace in , which focuses on the promotion of cyber peace in a sphere which has generated tremendous benefits and progress to mankind, but also spawned widespread criminal activities and created new avenues for intelligence gathering, industrial espionage, and conflict. Necessarily, this volume returns to these issues revolving around the overriding theme of the use of the cyber domain as a potent force for either good or evil, especially the impact of the 'dark' Internet on trust in the cyber dimension.
Here, however, its central theme promotes the concept of cyber confidence. This report presents the results of the GCI and the Cyberwellness country profiles for Member states.